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Sergei Prokopovich was a moderate socialist. In 1917, he held the post of the Minister of 
the Russian Provisional government coalition. In 1922, he immigrated first to Berlin and 
then to Prague. As a consequence, in Prague he organized the Economic Cabinet (1924–
1939), a well-known scientific center dedicated to s udying Soviet Russia. Considering 
Prokopovich political views, it is essential to pay attention to his article “Simple Thoughts” 
(“Prostye Mysli”).1 Here he set a task to reply to the queries, addressed to him in private 
letters, about his views on “the united front of emigration”. He justified his position that 
had been developed as a result of rethinking and revaluation of the events “by the end of the 
eighth year of the Russian Revolution.” (February, 1917-O. K.) 
Thus, in the work “Simple Thoughts” the attitude of Sergei Prokopovich to monarchism 
was totally explained. As Prokopovich wrote, “being an adult, I was consciously and al-
ways avoiding demagogic methods, I associated myself with such Russian public that ac-
tively fought against the Russian autocracy.”2 He claimed that the revolution experience 
had convinced him of the terrible legacy left by the regime based on the disenfranchisement 
of the people. As Prokopovich pointed out, after the revolution there had arisen even less 
motives to defend the monarchy or return power to the people who did not know how to use 
it. In addition, while in exile, he was responded to this allegation that “the Bolshevik Re-
gime causes even more injustice to the people, plus the destruction of any hope for the re-
vival of the country and its economy.” Agreeing on this, Sergei Prokopovich wrote, “The 
disease that has confounded the people after the death of autocracy is terrible for the coun-
try. But who cures one disease by inoculating another one? Who strives to impose another 
reaction during the reaction period?”3 
As opposed to a large part of Russian emigrants, Sergei Prokopovich did not idealize 
monarchy and did not approve of the restoration idea. In his opinion, antimonarchist views 
were adopted even by Russian peasants. He claimed: “I had to consider the peasant move-
ment slogans of 1919–1922 not as a politician, but as an observer-analyst. None of the 
peasant movements of these years put forward the monarchy slogan.”4 He confirmed that 
“at this time the monarchists were only among such people who were suffering the loss of 
their personal privileges.” In the mid-1920s the situation was clear. Russia had experienced 
                                                







a severe form of revolutionary fever and then was looking for ways of economic and politi-
cal revival. He wondered “whether it would find them through the peaceful displacement of 
harmful elements and replace them; or there would be new bloody explosions. It did not 
change the nature of the movement and the content of the process.”5 As Sergei Prokopovich 
emphasized, “this process is extremely diverse, highly deep” and “it cannot be eliminated 
with external ‘patches of salvation’.”6 
According to Sergei Prokopovich, the alliance with the Russian monarchists was impos-
sible. The monarchists, in his opinion, had forgotten heir dignity, the dignity of Russia, 
and, finally, the will of their people, who not only refused to urge foreigners, but also stub-
bornly fought against them. In another article “To each his own” (Kazhdomu svoe) Pro-
kopovich spoke out against the influence of monarchism in the emigration environment. 
Speaking of P.B. Struve’s statement that 85% of the Russian emigrants had been made up 
of monarchists, he wrote, “If Struve is right, it is a depressing sight. It means that the emi-
gration has been blended with just those that have been to be eliminated.”7 Expressing his 
negative attitude to the monarchist camp, Sergei Prokopovich simultaneously indicated his 
understanding of the democratic elements significance and their actions in the resulting 
situation. He demanded, “No concerted actions with Russian monarchists.”8 Assessing the 
position of monarchism in the emigration, he stressed that “the monarchists themselves do 
not keep both feet on the ground, clinging to a fictional leader. How can we go hand in 
hand with them?”9 At the same time, analyzing the popular masses behavior in Russia, Ser-
gei Prokopovich asked emigrants the following question : “What is to be proud of? Of the 
dark people who has realized neither the meaning of the Fatherland defense, nor the role of 
the All Russian Constituent Assembly as the mind an will of the nation? Of such a legacy 
of the monarchy?” He replied: 
 
“It is politically meaningless... Our path is opposite: taking advantages of relative 
spiritual freedom abroad, we must not back away in co fusion, we must continue 
persistent work to prepare new progressive elements, as well as conditions that are 
capable to facilitate Russia’s entry into the family of cultural peoples in the near fu-
ture.” 
 
Identifying the political tasks of the emigrants, S. Prokopovich wondered, “How should 
the emigrants treat this process and can they assist it?” According to his opinion, the assis-
tance could have been very essential, but before the emigration must have been cleared of 
the remnants of those ideologies that were characteristic of the Civil war. As S. Prokop-
ovich noted: 
 
“One of the main and the most harmful ideologies during this period is the view on 
the emigration as a material force capable of marching against the Soviet power. If 
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in 1918–20, it had a semblance, but by 1925, the ref rence to such essence of the 
emigration sounds like a clear and calculated quackery. In order to fulfill its true 
mission, the emigration must, first of all, mercilessly get rid of this lie about itself.” 
 
He further submitted that this lie could become truth, if any of the powers, pursuing its 
own goals, wanted to engage in single combat with Russia and tried to use Russian emi-
grants as scouts or cannon fodder. S. Prokopovich expressed his attitude to this in a follow-
ing way, “I personally do not agree to such a disgraceful role...”10 The war against the Fa-
therland with the help of foreigners, from his point of view, was a criminal thing and unac-
ceptable for a patriot. However, it is believed, this statement was more a rhetorical device 
than a reflective dimension of his political position. 
In assessing the situation of the emigration, S. Prokopovich wrote: “Without any mate-
rial force the emigration has, however, a major spiitual force. Developing it and projecting 
its development on the recovering Russia, the emigration can play an important role.”11 In 
his opinion, the new Russia, Asian in its past, having a thin layer of Europeanism only in 
the educated classes, needed at this stage to learn the American-European culture. To the 
question, “Where is the overthrow of the Soviet power?” according to S. Prokopovich, the 
answer was simple: 
 
“We will leave this important matter to the will ofthe Russian people. Once it had 
the strength to overthrow the hated autocracy; and even then the Russian emigrants 
only joined and helped the process that took place in factories, villages, and intel-
lectual circles.”12 
 
However, S. Prokopovich regretted that the Russian emigrants did not have this direct 
and blood connection with movements inside. And this was based on deep-rooted causes, 
not only the vigilance of the authority. Hardly anyo e wanted to understand them. Mean-
while, as he suggested, the emigration would be ablto take its proper political place only 
with the growth of certain political aspirations within Russia. He stated that “to give the 
leader a name on a platter now, which the inner Russia i  not at all eager to, means to create 
a theatrical sensation that is neither capable of raising the profile of the Russian name in 
Europe, nor influencing favorably on the country’s internal forces.”13 According to S. Pro-
kopovich, leaders were born within a struggling peopl , not during foreign congresses that 
had no links to the actors in Russia. Mentioning that e had different paths to follow with 
the politicians far from Russia, but trying to speak on its behalf, he stressed: 
 
“We are absolutely sure that even Russia, which is now silent, will find the means to 
indicate them their place. ‘The United front’ is impossible with those, who try to dig 
up old graves and pass off the mummies, kept in them, as the healers of severe 
wounds of the Fatherland.”14 
                                                








This position of S. Prokopovich was deeply contradictory. Assessing the balance of 
power in Russia correctly and understanding the illusory intentions of the emigration politi-
cians to return it to normal, he, however, did not g  beyond the declarations of “the will of 
the Russian people”. Although it is obvious that in he conditions of a strict and authoritar-
ian regime that resorted to mass repression, there could be no question of the free will of 
people. The intransigence to ideological opponents a d to other political trends (whether 
monarchists or far-left politics) objectively hindered the consolidation of the emigration 
forces. The suggestions of arranging the Europeanization of the Bolshevik regime can also 
be considered extremely amorphous. It could hardly have happened both in the conditions 
of the constant “military alerts” of the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s, and in his 
striving to control the relations with foreign countries. 
Reflecting on the Russian democracy goals and objectives, he suggested focusing on the 
European line of development, advocated for overcoming the political ignorance of the 
popular masses, and was a supporter of parliamentary democracy. Assessing its signi-
ficance, he wrote: “Anywhere and everywhere, the democracy progressive elements are 
fighting on two fronts: against the Communists, who are trying to destroy the state link in 
all countries, and against the monarchists, who are trying to return Europe to the Bourbons 
times.”15 Prokopovich believed that Russian democracy, that was weaker than the much-
experienced Western one, should be guided by the line of European democracy. Against 
this background, Prokopovich’s assessment of Russian democracy forces state was quite 
remarkable, as well as its support among the masses, and the general situation in which it 
was situated. He noted: “There are very few of us here abroad. But there are many, many of 
us in Russia”. He suggested relying on the experience of Russian peasants and workers, 
who, in his opinion, “deal with a difficult, bloody and suffering experience. This experience 
is our strength. [...] We believe, our ear is listening well to the sounds of the Russian land 
[...] all our hopes are there, in Russia, and not here abroad.”16 He assumed that the future, 
the new Russia would turn in Europe’s favor, not Asia. However, Russian democracy had 
certain practical tasks in emigration such as “to forge the ideology of the new democratic 
Russia”, “to strive to unite, first, with the democra y cultural layer in Russia, and second, to 
pave the way for the union of Russian democracy with the West ones.”17 It should be noted 
that this position was largely characteristic of the emigrant Republican Democratic camp as 
a whole. 
S. Prokopovich’s article “The ability of the masses to democracy” 18, posthumously pub-
lished in 1956, allows us to trace the author’s views on democracy in its development from 
primitive to more advanced forms. He considered the following aspects: 1. Primitive de-
mocracies, 2. The problem of the popular masses ability to political activity, 3. The growth 
of political consciousness and the popular masses will in Western Europe, 4. Dictatorship in 
politically underdeveloped countries. According to S. Prokopovich, each country had its 
own way of political national and historical development. First of all, he was interested not 
in the principle of democracy itself, which was unchangeable in any conditions, but in the 
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political institution of democracy in its national historical development. In particular, he 
wrote that “for the adoption of democratic forms of government the popular masses must 
currently have political knowledge and abilities acquired only during a long life in society 
and the State.”19 He believed that 
 
“the democratization of the political, economic and cultural system of society re-
quires, first of all, a great political and cultural ctivity of the popular masses. It 
implies the awakening of their spiritual interests and abilities to political and public 
life and active participation in it as well as the formation of the national will to po-
litical self-governance.”20 
 
In the view of S. N. Prokopovich, the private sector activity of society members was the 
closest thing to socio-political activity. He claimed that “along with the culture growth of 
the popular mass, its socio-economic and political a tivity also increases.” He believed that 
in modern societies, in addition to passive people, it was always possible to find a large 
number of those who had enterprise and took an increasing part in the creation of social and 
spiritual life. As a result, the political structure of a modern society could not be represented 
as the outdated theory of “heroes and crowd”. 
S. Prokopovich’s position was that the cultural andpolitical development of the popular 
masses made it possible to democratize the modern state; in the masses it awakened the ca-
pacity for political creativity and allowed to build all the state activities on democratic prin-
ciples, in particular, on self-governance and electiv  principle. As factors of the popular 
masses political growth he singled out the public education development, the population 
participation in cooperative and professional public self-governance bodies, as well as 
membership in political parties as schools of political thought that taught the masses to un-
derstand the difference between unattainable beautiful opias and real politics. The main 
task of democracy, according to S. Prokopovich, was to overcome the political ignorance of 
the popular masses, to fight their political impressionability and illusions. He estimated that 
this process was taking place in the parliamentary democracies of Europe and America. 
From his point of view, the Parliament discussion of all political life issues of the country 
by people, possessing great political knowledge and experience, had an educational politi-
cal influence on the whole bulk of voters. Prokopovich believed that the equality of politi-
cal rights did not give people equal abilities and knowledge: if the popular masses knew 
what was ultimately necessary for their good, at the same time they did not always realize 
what means could be used to achieve these goals. However, according to S. Prokopovich, 
“governmental machine, as it is currently organized in parliamentary countries, is hardly 
suitable for solving complex economic, social and cultural problems.”21 
Speaking about the process of political and cultural development in underdeveloped 
countries, he mentioned such a feature as their intention to preserve public institutions and 
achieved development degree. Their development was mainly limited to the assimilation of  
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foreign achievements, which did not allow them to make the transition to a higher stage of 
political development. As S. Prokopovich pointed out, 
 
“in underdeveloped countries instead of continuous progressive political evolution 
we find a constant succession of periods of stagnatio  and forced leaps forward, 
revolutions, representatives of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, Lenin and Sta-
lin, military and popular dictatorships. In underdeveloped states the progressive 
transformations, which the population does not realize and does not want, are often 
caused by the intention of the authorities for national independence as the first con-
dition for national cultural development.”22 
 
The main reason for the distinction between Western d mocracy in advanced countries 
and Eastern democracy in underdeveloped ones lied in the political role of the vocal minor-
ity. S. Prokopovich drew special attention to the fact that in socio-political life the ways of 
establishing democracy were important, not only their final goals, not only the motives that 
determined them: “Violent measures have a demoralizing effect both on the people, teach-
ing it to violence and sycophancy, and on the people’s dictatorship, teaching it to use vio-
lence as the easiest way to dominate.”23 
Speaking about S. Prokopovich’s assessment of the Institute for Democracy, it becomes 
clear that the Western way of society and state devlopment was preferable for him. Russia, 
on the other hand, was considered as an Eastern country, but he wanted for it the democ-
ratic transformations that would allow it to embark on the Western path of development. In 
this area his views largely coincided with the views of P. Milyukov. Both of them defined a 
possible path of Russia development as the Western one. “Westernism” can be seen in his 
numerous prognoses about the future development of the Russian countryside. As one of 
the memoirists D. Lutokhin recalled, S. Prokopovich had been very much engaged in stu-
dying the economy of the Russian countryside and argued that “a peasant should be given 
not only the land, but the capital, it is necessary to provide him with perfect technical tools, 
which will not be possible to implement without large financial transactions with the par-
ticipation of America.”24 However, the future amended the political assessments of democ-
racy that had been expressed by S. Prokopovich. It appeared that the pattern “Western de-
mocracy (advanced states) – Eastern despotism (underdeveloped states)” was not always 
applicable to the interpretation of the political history of Europe in the 20th century, which 
had been witnessed by the Russian economist. 
In the system of S. Prokopovich’s political views an important place was occupied by 
the assessment of the October revolution. He believed that in order to evaluate this pheno-
menon, it was necessary, first of all, to understand it as a historical event, “as a necessary or 
destructive, but inevitable link in the history of the Russian people.”25 In his opinion, the 
first question that the researcher of October, 1917, was curious about was: “How and why 
had for the peasant Russia, which had been suffering primarily from the primitive nature of 
agriculture and agricultural resettlement, the main t sk become to fight the capitalist sys-
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tem, which was just beginning to develop in the country?” Referring to the essence of this 
phenomenon, he believed that “the problem of communism was not a natural stage on the 
way of economic and cultural growth of the Russian people in the first quarter of the 20th 
century. This phenomenon is undoubtedly of a negative nature, not organically connected 
with the process of economic and social development of Russian democracy.”26 According 
to S. Prokopovich, the past 10 years in Russia showed that the idea of communism was not 
viable. He believed that “the Russian experience has shown that it is not a creative idea of 
the future, but an empty romantic dream…”27 In general, according to S. Prokopovich, a 
plurality of factors determined the current situation n Russia, he wanted that “the transition 
to a state of law would be made by the forces of the Russian people themselves and in line 
with the ideals and experience of modern democracy.” 28 
The values associated with the concept of “nation” played an important role in the lib-
eral political theory of the emigration. An importan  place was taken by the analysis of na-
tional issues and movements in the works of S. Prokop vich as well. In his article “On the 
economic foundations of the national question” he wrote: 
 
“The national movements played a very important role in the October revolution, 
disintegrating the army at the front and eroding the power of the Provisional Gov-
ernment in the rear. Obviously, no matter how the power, that will govern the Rus-
sian state, will be named and how this state itself wil  be named, the national issues 
and movements will play a very significant, perhaps decisive role in its fate.”29 
 
It is no accident that when assessing S. Prokopovich’s views on the national issue, the 
newspaper “Rul”, that was influential in the emigration, emphasized his opinion that “it is 
better to have a small state, but with a single state language, than a multilingual federation 
that is doomed to an imminent collapse.” For S. Prokop vich when examining national is-
sues and movements, a historical approach was required, and he argued that “where we are 
dealing with historical development, the economic aspect inevitably occupies a central po-
sition.”30 In his opinion, at different stages of economic development the content, volume 
and forms of national existence and national struggle were different, so he believed that 
with the change in the economic structure of society its national life would also change. 
Highlighting the characteristic features of the national life at various stages of economic 
growth of society, S. Prokopovich used the so-called “classical scheme”31 of society develop-
ment. He argued that national life appeared only at the stage of the urban life development, 
and then the material basis for the modern state was already being created at the stage of 
capitalism development with the national market andnational economy development. At 
the same time, modern political nations were formed simultaneously with the state. Ethnic 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 9. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Prokopovich Sergey N. On the economic foundations f the national question. Russian economic 
digest, no.9 (1927): 5–50. 
30 Ibid. 23. 





nationalities gave way to the new, much more powerful national formations, which were 
based not on a race and language, but, above all, economic links that united them. S. Pro-
kopovich believed that the state, for the better development of the national economy, 
wanted to destroy national boundaries on its territory and erase existing national differences 
in order to “unite all the ethnic groups”, living on its territory.32 Therefore, every modern 
cultural European or American nation was a conglomerate of many ethnic nationalities, 
merged into the highest degree of unity – the modern national state. The United States were 
the most spectacular example for him. He believed that the origin of modern nations was 
not based on coercion, but on economic, political, and social interests: 
 
“The formation of a national economy on a large territory inhabited by several tens 
of millions of people makes special demands on the political and administrative 
structure, on the development of public relations, and on the collective psychology 
of the popular masses.” 
 
Due to this, the development of capitalist economy along with the formation of a mod-
ern state created a political nation.33 
Speaking about the political role of the state in the national formation, S. Prokopovich 
stressed that in order to overcome underdevelopment of the pre-capitalist forms of economy 
and clear the way for the new economic principles pnetration into various segments of the 
population, it was predominant to ensure the targeted s ate intervention. He noted that the 
issue of state and national formation was a very complex process in which the economic 
aspect played a decisive role: 
 
“In the struggle for national interests, the idea of nationality is born. Under favor-
able conditions, the movement acquires a political character and leads to the politi-
cal liberation of ethnic nationality… And with the development of capitalist rela-
tions and the national market, the character of the national movement changes radi-
cally.” 34 
 
In his opinion, the state independence required, first of all, a developed economy, and if 
this was not the case, then the political independence became a fiction. Indeed, for S. Pro-
kopovich the economic factor was the dominant force in the national development: 
 
“The economic aspect confirms the nation intention f r political self-determination 
within ethnic bounds, the attempt to join territories inhabited by other, less econo-
mically developed nations. Freed from political dependence, young nationalities can 
easily fall into economic dependence, no less serious. Their trouble is that their po-
litical life is deprived of the economic foundation because of their economic back-
wardness.”35 
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Referring to the national problems of Russia, he argued that the solution of the national 
question was difficult, because Russia had been devastated by the war and the revolution, 
as well as the Communists management. Considering the prospects for Russia’s develop-
ment, S. Prokopovich believed that, with the backwardness of Russian industry, the main 
national task was to preserve the country’s political ndependence. He stressed that “the 
great difference in the economic structure of different nationalities in Russia makes it clear 
why we find a different form of national ideology and patriotism in Russians than in 
Ukrainians and Belarusians.” He explained this by the difference of each nationality in the 
economic stages of development. For the future economic development of Russia, accor-
ding to Prokopovich, it was necessary to provide the unity of law and the state language, to 
create legal order and railways. Russia should go not through political separation, but 
through the resolution of national conflicts. This path consisted in overcoming economic, 
social and cultural backwardness, in developing the national economy and productivity. 
Thus, for the emergence, existence and development of a modern democratic state, it was 
necessary to take into account a number of conditios: the existence of a political culture of 
the nation, economic activity, as well as the state regulatory role in this process. 
S. Prokopovich’s political views were demonstrated in his report at a meeting of foreign 
groups of the Constitutional Democratic Party on July 24, 1922.36 He expressed theoretical 
views on the reasons for the need to create such a political organization as “The Republican 
Democratic Union”. He believed that the flush of Bolshevism that had hit the country by 
the end of 1917, and especially in 1918–1919, would disappear, and Russia would return to 
a healthy state. As he believed, Bolshevism had been ov rcome psychologically. As a re-
sult, a new situation emerged. S. Prokopovich argued that the opinion that the old Russia 
had died and its new life had begun in February, 1917, was incorrect. Russia was alive and 
the starting point of development would be the Bolshevik coup. He believed that the deci-
sive role in this case belonged to the peasantry, which had changed a lot. It had grown, its 
horizons had expanded very much, the former abjection had disappeared and people res-
pected themselves. The peasants were aware that they wer  independent “at home” and this 
was the “first plus” of everything that had been exp rienced. The second one was the crea-
tion of local authorities (volispolkoms), which were volost zemstvos in fact. The “third 
plus” was the Red army that was full of national interests, which was especially valuable 
for the future formation of Russia. These were the thr e main factors of Russia’s future 
structure. As for the workers, S. Prokopovich believed that this class, due to its privileged 
position and its peculiar Praetorian psychology, was useless for creating a new state order. 
According to S. Prokopovich, Russia needed spiritual centers, which could not be cur-
rently created because of the strict control of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission 
(GPU). Therefore, it was necessary to establish sucpiritual centers abroad, but not for the 
emigration interests, but for the new Russia “establishment”. These centers were to be 
guided by three directives. First, it was necessary to desist from the monarchy restoration 
and revenge, second, it was important to renounce so ialism, and third, the spiritual centers 
must not think themselves the representatives of the Russian people and must not demand 
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any power. In his opinion, the role of the spiritual centers should consist only “in maintain-
ing the new growing movement in Russia.” 
Thus, in his political views, S. Prokopovich was a t unch advocate of democracy, po-
litical freedom, and the republican democratic regime. This is attested, first of all, by his 
categorical refusal to compromise with the monarchists, as well as his strict position of the 
importance of democratic elements in the life of society. He left the question of over-
throwing the Soviet power to the “will of the Russian people” and not to the emigration ac-
tions and, moreover, intervention, which was very contradictory, since he realized, on the 
one hand, the illusory intentions of prominent emigrants, and, on the other hand, the impos-
sibility of implementing the “will of the people” in the USSR in the 1930s under a totalitar-
ian regime. 
S. Prokopovich advocated a historical approach while examining the national issues, 
considered the economic factor to be the dominant factor of national development, and pro-
posed to focus on the European line of development of a parliamentary democracy. He de-
fended his vision of socialism in his public and political activities. In different years of life 
in exile, the degree of “politics” occupation of S. Prokopovich was different. In general, in 
the political arena of the emigration his place canbe defined as “left of center”. His politi-
cal position, expressed on such issues as the meaning of democracy, the definition of the 
place and the role of the emigration, his point of view on the national issue and the attitude 
to Soviet Russia, undoubtedly was “left-center”. 
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Sergei Prokopovich was a moderate socialist and he held the post of minister of the coali-
tion Provisional Government of Russia in 1917. In 1922 he was obliged to emigrate first to 
Berlin, and then to Prague. In Prague, he organized th  Economic Cabinet (1924–1939), a 
well-known scientific center for the study of Soviet Russia. 
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Unlike a significant part of the Russian emigration, Sergei Prokopovich did not idealize 
the monarchy and did not approve of the idea of resto ation. He posed the question of over-
throwing Soviet power to the ”will of the Russian people”, but not to acts of emigration and 
moreover the intervention. Such position was very controversial, since he understood, on 
the one hand, the illusory intentions of prominent migrants, and, on the other hand, the 
impossibility of realizing the ”will of the people”, in the USSR in the 1930s under the cir-
cumstances of the totalitarian regime. 
Reflecting on the goals and objectives of Russian democracy, he proposed orienting 
himself towards the European line of development, advocated overcoming the political ig-
norance of the masses, and was a supporter of parliamentary democracy. 
Analyzing the role of the state in the nation-building process, Sergei Prokopovich 
pointed out generally the economic factor as the dominant of national progress. First of all, 
Prokopovich advocated a historical approach to the s udy of national issues, when the de-
velopment of the capitalist economy simultaneously with the formation of the state created 
a political nation (for instance in the USA). As for the independence of the state, firstly, the 
developed and independent economy was needed, because if it is not present, then political 
independence becomes a fiction. Considering Russian case, he believed that the resolution 
of the national question was very difficult because th  country was devastated by the Civil 
war and the revolution, but it was extremely necessary for the future development of Russia 
to retain the unity of the state language and legal order, the suitable development of indus-
try and railways too. 
According to his political views, Sergei Prokopovich was a supporter of democracy, po-
litical freedom, and a social state. Thus, it can be attributed to the left-centrist wing of the 
traditional political spectrum. 
 
